报告题目：Bundled School Choice（捆绑式择校问题）
报告人：张军（南京审计大学）
报告时间：2025年10月24日（星期五）13:00-14:30
报告地点：suncitygroup太阳新城318会议室
邀请部门：经济学系

 

报告人简介：
张军，南京审计大学社会与经济研究院教授，研究领域是博弈论、市场设计理论，近年在American Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior，Economic Theory等国际期刊上发表多篇论文。获国家自然科学基金优秀青年项目、青年项目、中国信息经济学会乌家培资助计划等支持。

 

报告摘要：
This paper proposes a novel school choice system where schools are grouped into hierarchical bundles and offered to students as options for preference reports. By listing a bundle, a student seeks admission to any school within it without ranking the schools. This approach helps students who struggle to rank schools precisely and expands options on limited preference lists, potentially improving match outcomes. We design a modified deferred acceptance mechanism to handle bundle reports while preserving stability. Laboratory experiments support our theory, showing that well-constructed bundles aligned with student preferences enhance welfare and match rates without compromising fairness. Practical applications are discussed.